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1 
THE SEARCH FOR CLARITY IN ATTORNEY’S DUTY TO GOOGLE 
Michael Thomas Murphy* 
INTRODUCTION 
Discussion of an attorney’s “Duty to Google”1 is filtering into court 
opinions, articles and Continuing Legal Education classes.2 Attorneys 
 
* Clinical Supervisor and Lecturer at the Entrepreneurship Legal Clinic 
at the University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School. In memory of my 
mother, Carol Murphy, who learned late in her life how to check “the 
Googles.”  Thanks to Alvin Dong, Paul Riermaier and Yuqing Zheng 
for research assistance. Special thanks to Susan Brooks, Victoria Chase, 
Anne Freedman, Rosemarie Greismer, Sarah Katz, and Spencer Rand 
for their encouragement and feedback. All mistakes are mine.  
  
1 To “Google” a subject for inquiry on the internet is a ubiquitous term. 
See Jeffrey Bellin & Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Trial by Google: 
Judicial Notice in the Information Age, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1137 (2014) 
(citing Google, DICTIONARY.COM, 
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/google?s=) (“[T]o use a search 
engine such as Google to find information, a website address, etc., on 
the Internet.”). This Article uses the term “to Google” to mean “to 
perform an internet search.”  
2 See, e.g., The Cybersleuth’s Guide to the Internet: Super Search 
Engine Strategies for Discovery, Trial Preparation, and to Successfully 
Complete Transactions, NEW YORK CITY BAR CENTER FOR CLE (July 
25, 2013), 
https://www.nycbar.org/CLE/pdf/07_13/edu/Super%20Search%20Engi
ne-072513.pdf (CLE description which states that attorneys can “[l]earn 
how the Internet is changing the way legal professionals need to 
research and run their practice to competently represent their clients.” It 
continues:  
Find out if failing to “Google” as part of the due diligence process 
could keep you from winning a case or successfully completing a 
transaction. Uncover the best research strategies and learn to 
master Google. Don’t be left behind in exploiting this gold mine 
of information that will assist you in meeting your investigative  
research obligations… 
Id. 
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have been reprimanded or sanctioned in cases in which they failed to 
conduct an internet search for relevant information about a matter, 
whether it is about their own client,3 a party,4 witness,5 or third party,6 
and that failure either caused harm or wasted the court’s time.7  
 
The “Duty to Google” has its roots in an attorney’s duty to 
investigate the facts surrounding her work, which is commonly tied to 
 
3 See, e.g., Cajamarca v. Regal Entertainment Group, 2012 WL 
3782437 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2012) (In discovery, attorney did not 
search own client’s publicly available social media posts which would 
have cast severe doubt on her employment discrimination claims); In 
the Matter of Tony L. Axam, 297 Ga 786 (Ga. 2015) (Attorney should 
have verified transaction details before assisting in transaction).  
4 Munster v. Groce, 829 N.E.2d 52, 62 n 3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005)  (failure 
to Google absent defendant made attempted service void); Dubois v. 
Butler ex rel. Butler, 901 So.2d 1029, 1031 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) 
(Attorney’s failure to Google in attempt to locate missing defendant was 
denounced by the Court); Weatherly v. Optimum Asset Mgmt., Inc., 923 
So. 2d 118 (La. App. 2005) (Tax sale notice was invalid where attorney 
failed to Google address before attempted service of current owner, who 
lived out of state). 
5 Cannedy v. Adams, 2009 WL 3711958 at 280 (C.D. Cal. 2009) 
(Failure to search for and find evidence of a profile containing a 
purported molestation victim’s recantations was ineffective assistance 
of counsel); Griffin v. Maryland, 192 Md. App. 518, 524 (2010) (citing 
Sharon Nelson et al., The Legal Implications of Social Networking, 22 
REGENT U.L. REV. 1, 1-2 (2009/2010) and noting that “it should now be 
a matter of professional competence for attorneys to take the time to 
investigate social networking sites.”) 
6 Iowa Supreme Ct. Att'y Disciplinary Bd. v. Wright, 840 N.W.2d 295, 
303 (Iowa 2013) (Failure to search and discover that a deal that a client 
was considering was an obvious scam). 
7 Johnson v. McCullough, 306 306 S.W. 3d 551, 598-599 (Mo. banc 
2010) (Failure to object to juror before trial was waived where juror’s 
bias was available to attorneys upon an internet search). 
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the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (hereinafter “Model Rules”).8 
The Model Rules state that “competent handling of a particular matter 
includes inquiry into and analysis of the factual and legal elements of 
the problem, and use of methods and procedures meeting the standards 
of competent practitioners.”9 Searching for publicly-available 
information is then “encompassed within an attorney's duty to 
investigate,” and thus part of an attorney’s core competency.10 This 
competency includes technological proficiency, not just rote use.11  
 
Notably to that effect, the American Bar Association has included 
technological competence as part of the duty of competence described 
in Rule 1.1 of the Model Rules, and as of this writing, 38 states have 
adopted that rule in some way.12 (Though as Mark Britton noted, this 
 
8 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1, cmt. 5 (2015) (“Competent 
handling of a particular matter includes inquiry into and analysis of the 
factual and legal elements of the problem, and use of methods and 
procedures meeting the standards of competent practitioners. It also 
includes adequate preparation.”) Of course, the Model Rules do not in 
and of themselves have legal effect – states much adopt them, and often 
do, but not word-for-word. For a breakdown of the adoption of this 
change to the Model Rules, see John G. Browning, The New Duty of 
Digital Competence: Being Ethical and Competent int he Age of 
Facebook and Twitter, 44 U. DAYTON L. REV. 179, 180-184 (2019). 
9 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1, cmt. 5 (2015).  
10 Vanessa S. Browne-Barbour, Why Can't We Be Friends: Ethical 
Concerns in the Use of Social Media, 57 S. TEX. L. REV. 551, 561-562 
(2016), quoting Agnieszka McPeak, Social Media Snooping and its 
Ethical Bounds, 46 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 845, 875-876 (2014).  
11 Browning, supra note 8, at 196-197 (Discussing failures of attorneys 
to use technology and concluding that attorneys must be 
“knowledgeable of both the benefits and the risks of the technology that 
is out there, including the functionality of the technology they are 
actually using (or, in some cases, should be using).”) 
12 9 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (Am. Bar Assoc. 2016) 
(“Model Rules)” The rule states that “A lawyer shall provide competent 
representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal 
knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary 
for the representation.”; Lori D. Johnson, Navigating Technology 
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adoption is suspiciously slow and incomplete).13  “Competence” is of 
course subject to interpretation, but is defined by the rule as requiring 
"inquiry into and analysis of the legal and factual elements of the [legal] 
problem.".14 Lori Johnson notes that “[e]xisting comments to Rule 1.1 
indicate that competence is considered on a case-by-case basis, in a 
somewhat subjective manner. Specifically, Comment 1 to Rule 1.1 
indicates that competence is keyed to the “nature of the matter” and “the 
lawyer’s training and experience in the field.”15 
 
Googling is an extraordinary way for an attorney undertaking a 
factual inquiry to obtain an immense amount of information in a short 
time, and “[l]awyers, after all, are in the information  business.”16 As 
Andrew Perlman concluded, “[s]imply put, lawyers cannot just stick 
their heads in the sand when it comes to Internet investigations.”17  
Such an “ostrich-like” attorney would risk more than just violating a 
state rule of professional conduct; as the cases below illustrate, a failure 
to investigate the facts of a matter can expose an attorney to allegations 
of ineffective assistance of counsel and malpractice.  
 
Part I of this Article surveys cases of these “ostrich” occurrences 
 
Competence in Transactional Practice, 65 VILL. L. REV. 159, 163 
(2020), https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol65/iss1/3 (“As 
Rule 1.1 clearly focuses on the ‘client’ and ‘representation,’ guidance 
surrounding Comment 8 must do the same, and lawyers should be 
required to become and remain competent in any technology used by, or 
beneficial to, their clients.”).    
13 Mark Britton, Behind Stables and Saloons: The Legal Profession's 
Race to the Back of the Technological Pack, 90 FLA. B.J. 34 (Jan. 2016) 
(Noting that the slow adoption is further evidence that “[l]awyers lag 
behind their clients (the general population) and even other professions 
in adopting new technology.”). 
14 9 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (Am. Bar Assoc. 2016). 
15 Johnson, supra note 12, at 165-166.  
16 Jamie J. Baker, Beyond the Information Age: The Duty of Technology 
Competence in the Algorithmic Society, 69 S. C. L. REV. 557, 570 
(2018). 
17 Andrew Perlman, The Twenty-First Century Lawyer's Evolving 
Ethical Duty of Competence, 22 PROFESSIONAL LAWYER 22, 28 (2014). 
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and recent commentary, noting the curious emergence of googling as a 
logical extension of an attorney’s duty of investigation.18 Part II 
examines the sources of the duty of investigation, and in doing so, 
speculates as to the best location for a unified Duty to Google. Part III 
examines the likely scenarios in legal practice where the Duty to 
Google could apply. Part IV examines the extent of the Duty to Google 
in those circumstances, in an attempt to find some guidance for 
attorneys to meet this emerging professional requirement.  It explores 
how an emerging technology might become so ubiquitous that it 
becomes part of an attorney’s investigation duty, and also whether it is 
possible to provide a baseline for an extent of reasonable use of that 
technology. Part V attempts to define the parameters of a codified Duty 
to Google as an addition to, or its own, rule of professional conduct. 
The Article concludes with thoughts of the future, and how further 
advances in technology may shape this duty in the years to come.  
I. THE CURIOUS APPEARANCE OF THE DUTY TO GOOGLE 
The “Duty to Google” contemplates that certain readily-available 
information on the public internet is so accessible that it must be 
discovered, collected, and examined by an attorney, or else that attorney 
is acting unethically, committing malpractice, or both. Beyond 
reputational embarrassment and client dissatisfaction, courts can issue – 
and have issued - sanctions for an attorney who fails to Google pertinent 
information. These sanctions can be monetary, in the form of refunded 
client fees and other damages based on the error, or could take the form 
of prescribing attorney training or a certification that Googling will be 
part of future conduct. The latter sanctions are of the nature of a public 
reprimand, a “benchslap”19 that creates bad press in an industry that 
 
18 Agnieszka McPeak, Social Media Snooping and its Ethical Bounds, 
46 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 845, 862 (2014) (Reviewing cases and concluding that 
“[L]egal ethics rules impose a duty on lawyers to use reasonable efforts 
to investigate facts and to avoid frivolous claims, even with computer 
aided legal and factual research.”) 
19 This term is colloquial, and refers to an admonishment from the 
bench to a misbehaving counsel (or litigant). See Dwight H. Sullivan & 
Eugene R. Fidell, Winding (Back) the Crazy Clock: The Origins of a 
Benchslap, 19 GREEN BAG 2D 397 (2016) (“‘Benchslap’ made its 
Black’s Law Dictionary debut in the 10th edition, defined as: “A 
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relies on reputation.20  
 
It is clear from the cases below that today’s attorney has a duty to 
use technology – for the purposes of this article, “Googling” or another 
public internet search – to investigate key aspects of a matter such as 
her client, adversary, facts, and even potential jurors.  These cases show 
that a savvy attorney satisfying her Duty to Google should consider at 
least the following sources in her internet research: social media 
evidence, the location of missing witnesses or parties, verifiable facts in 
dispute, and even the attorney’s own client.  
 
a.  The Duty to Google the Location of Missing 
Witnesses and Parties 
 
Perhaps the most obvious instance in which the duty to Google 
arises is one in which the attorney must locate a person, for service or 
other participation in a legal proceeding.  For example, in Munster v. 
Groce,21 the Court of Appeals of Indiana questioned the plaintiff’s 
efforts to effectuate service on a missing individual defendant. The 
Court found the plaintiff’s efforts to be insufficient because the 
platiniff’s attorney did not run a skip trace, do a public records search or 
 
judge’s sharp rebuke of counsel, a litigant, or perhaps another judge; 
esp., a scathing remark from a judge or magistrate to an attorney after 
an objection from opposing counsel has been sustained.’”) Citing 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 185 (10th ed. 2014)”); Heidi K. 
Brown, Converting Benchslaps to Backslaps: Instilling Professional 
Accountability in New Legal Writers by Teaching and Reinforcing 
Context, 11 LEGAL COMM. & RHETORIC: JALWD 109 (2014). 
20 Fred C. Zacharias, Effects of Reputation on the Legal Profession, 65 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 173, 176-183 (2008) (Discussing the importance 
of attorney reputation); id. at 176 (“Most obviously, lawyers’ 
reputations are important for clients planning to hire an attorney. In the 
absence of mechanisms that publicly grade attorneys, clients’ means of 
selecting lawyers are limited to reviewing the lawyers’ objective 
qualifications (e.g., their educational background), interviewing 
candidates, contacting references, and word of mouth.”). 
21 829 N.E.2d 52, (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). 
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an internet search.22 Worse still, the court itself performed a search and 
found that it would be easy for an attorney to find an address for the 
defendant, and the names of family members who may have known his 
whereabouts.23 
 
In a similar case in Florida, Dubois v. Butler,24 the plaintiff 
searching for a missing defendant checked directory assistance looking 
for an address to serve a defendant – and nothing more. The standard 
for whether such an effort is sufficient is, in the Court’s words, whether 
the plaintiff failed to follow an “obvious” lead or available resource.25  
The court found that an internet search was an “obvious” avenue that 
the plaintiff ignored.26  In taking issue with the plaintiff’s sole call to 
directory assistance, cheekily stated that “advances in modern 
technology and the widespread use of the Internet have sent the 
investigative technique of a call to directory assistance the way of the 
horse and buggy and the eight track stereo.”27 
 
In Weatherly v. Optimum Asset Mgmt., Inc.,28 a Louisiana trial court 
considered whether a party was “reasonably identifiable” for the 
purposes of requiring actual service of a tax sale.  The defendant argued 
 
22 Id.  
23 Specifically, the court wrote:  
 
We do note that there is no evidence in this case of a 
public records or internet search for Groce …. In fact, we 
discovered, upon entering "Joe Groce Indiana" into the 
Google search engine, an address for Groce that differed 
from either address used in this case, as well as an 
apparent obituary for Groce's mother that listed numerous 
surviving relatives who might have known his 
whereabouts. 
 
Id. 
24 901 So.2d 1029 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005). 
25Id. at 1030.   
26 Id.  
27 Id. 
28 923 So.2d 118 (La. Ct. App. 2005). 
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that the plaintiff was not “reasonably identifiable” because the 
defendant did not have basic contact information for the plaintiff.29 The 
trial court performed its own internet search for plaintiff and, based on 
its results, found that the plaintiff was “reasonably identifiable.”30 The 
appeals court questioned the ability of the judge to take judicial notice 
of its own internet search, but noted that Plaintiff nevertheless did not 
perform a sufficient search.31 
 
b.  The Duty to Google Verifiable Facts in Dispute 
 
An attorney also has a Duty to Google facts in dispute, especially 
those advanced by a witness. In Cannedy v. Adams, a California court 
considered an ineffective assistance counsel claim in a molestation case 
against petitioner, a stepfather accused of molesting his stepdaughter.32 
Petitioner argued that, against his urging, his attorney failed to 
investigate a friend of the victim, who would have testified that she saw 
exculpating evidence (essentially, that the victim fabricated her 
allegations) on the victim’s social media page, specifically an AOL 
Instant Messenger profile.33 The court found this failure to follow up 
with this witness to be ineffective assistance of counsel, in that it was 
unreasonable conduct.34 In attempting to ascertain why petitioner’s 
attorney failed to contact this witness, the Court surmised that the 
attorney may have lacked the technological knowledge and skill to 
appreciate the value of this information and to obtain it.35 The Court 
concluded that the attorney may have “misunderstood the workings of 
AOL Instant Messenger in ways that caused him to depreciate the value 
of the information.”36 It is interesting to note that here petitoner’s 
attorney was held to the ineffective assistance of counsel standard – one 
in which the attorney’s conduct falls “below an objective standard of 
 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 123. 
32 No. ED CV 08-1230-CJC(E), 2009 WL 3711958 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 
2009). 
33 Id. at *16. 
34 Id. at *29. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 34 n.19.  
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reasonableness”37 – not because the attorney did not use certain 
technology but because the attorney lacked the technical knowledge to 
use it proficiently.  If this case is an indicator, technological proficiency, 
not just use, comprises the Duty to Google.   
 
In Iowa Supreme Ct. Att'y Disciplinary Bd. v. Wright,38 an attorney 
learned from a client that the client stood to inherent a large sum of 
money from a long-lost relative in Nigeria, such sum to be released 
once the client paid an outstanding tax debt to the Nigerian 
government.39 The attorney agreed to represent the client for a 10% 
commission on the recovered funds.40 The attorney then reached out to 
other clients and arranged for those clients to lend money so that the 
Nigerian tax debt could be paid.41 The attorney then facilitated the 
repayment of the Nigerian tax debt.42 Most readers of this Article sadly 
shaking their heads reading this sentence already know what the 
attorney in Wright did not: the “business deal” was actually a classic 
internet scam referred to as the “Nigerian Prince” scam.43 The client 
 
37 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). 
38 840 N.W.2d 295, 301-04 (Iowa 2013). 
39 Id. at 301. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. The “Nigerian Prince” scam has been known since the 1990s, and 
has made its way into popular culture on television shows such as “30 
Rock” and “The Office”.  See Finn Brunton, “The Long, Weird History 
of the Nigerian E-mail Scam,” Boston Globe, May 19, 2013. 
https://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2013/05/18/the-long-weird-history-
nigerian-mail-scam/C8bIhwQSVoygYtrlxsJTlJ/story.html (“The deal is 
this: You make a small initial outlay (the advance fee), in exchange for 
an enormous return. But once you take the bait, things inevitably begin 
to go wrong. The customs staff changes, new bribes are needed, a key 
person in the transaction falls ill. Just a little more money, the writer 
promises, and you'll make it all back.”).  It is a version of the “advance 
fee” scam, which has its roots at least as far back as the “Spanish 
Prisoner” scams of the 19th century. Id. In that scam, a Spanish soldier 
concealed money while fighting in the Spanish-American war, only to 
be tragically and inconveniently imprisoned in Spain, needing an 
DUTY TO GOOGLE 8/27/2020  4:03 PM 
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and attorney received no money, and the other clients who lent money 
were never repaid.44 The attorney’s license to practice law was 
suspended for a year.45 In so doing, the Iowa Supreme Court noted 
(somewhat charitably) that the “ evidence in this case established that a 
cursory internet search …. Would have revealed evidence that [the 
Client’s] dream of a Nigerian inheritance was probably based on a 
scam.”46 The court further observed that “‘Wright appears to have 
honestly believed - and continues to believe - that one day a trunk full 
of . . . one hundred dollar bills is going to appear upon his office 
doorstep,’” and that other attorneys had fallen for the same ruse.47 
 
The Duty to Google facts has also extended into searching social 
media. As one commentator noted, “In light of the amount of time 
Americans spend online, and the ease with which users freely share 
information with others, it follows that lawyers should utilize social 
media to research and investigate cases on behalf of their clients.”48  In 
Griffin v. Maryland,49 the court considered the admissibility of social 
media evidence.  Citing a seminal case in this area, Lorraine v. Markel 
Am. Ins. Co.,50 the court noted that “[t]he design and purpose of social 
media sites make them especially fertile ground for ‘statements 
involving observations of events surrounding us, statements regarding 
how we feel, our plans and motives, and our feelings (emotional and 
physical)[.]”51  In other words, social media evidence can be among the 
most important evidence in a case, and is generally only available 
through an electronic search and often the use of the social media 
 
American to recover it. Id.  The scam is still in use today. See Megan 
Leonhardt, “‘Nigerian Prince’ Email Scams Still Rake in Over 
$700,000 a Year—Here’s How to Protect Yourself,” CNBC.com, April 
18, 2019. https://www.cnbc.com/2019/04/18/nigerian-prince-scams-
still-rake-in-over-700000-dollars-a-year.html. 
44 Id. 
45 Id.  
46 Id.  
47 Browning, supra note 8, at 193, citing Wright, 840 N.W.2d at 300.  
48 Browne-Barbour, supra note 10, at 552. 
49 995 A.2d 791 (Md. 2010).  
50 241 F.R.D. 534, 569 (D. Md. 2007). 
51 Griffin, 995 A.2d at 800 (collecting cases). 
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platform.52  The Court adopted Lorranie’s reasoning that “it should now 
be a matter of professional competence for attorneys to take the time to 
investigate social networking sites.”53 
 
c. The Duty to Google the Client 
 
An attorney has a Duty to Google her own client. For example, a 
high-profile attorney in Georgia, Tony Axam,  voluntarily surrendered 
his license after an ethics investigation where he failed to verify 
transaction information in a matter.54 Specifically, Mr. Axam agreed to 
act as a “paymaster” for a client and distribute funds for the client, 
taking a commission as payment.55 Mr. Axam received a wire transfer 
from an individual connected to his client and deposited that money into 
his firm operating account.56 The Georgia Supreme Court noted  that: 
 
Axam [] admitted that he did not read the terms of the trading 
platform contract in connection with which he was serving as 
“paymaster,” that he did not know the nature of the business 
dealings between his client and the other individual, and that he 
asked no questions about the transaction that he facilitated. 
Although Axam noted  that the disbursement instructions from 
his client came by an e-mail that referred to his client by a 
different name than that by which he knew her, he says that he 
assumed that the other name was just a trade name for his 
client.57 
 
Based upon this failure to investigate details of the somewhat shadowy 
transaction, and the misappropriating of funds into his operating 
account, Axam agreed to surrender his license.58  
 
The Duty to Google one’s client has again extended to social media 
information, at least to the extent such information is available to the 
 
52 McPeak, supra note 10, at 877. 
53 Id.  
54 Axam, 297 Ga., at 786. 
55 Id. at 1.  
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 1-2.  
58 Id. at 2.  
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attorney.59 For example, in Cajamarca v. Regal Entertainment Group, a 
sexual harassment case, readily available social media evidence 
revealed that the Plaintiff, rather than being severely incapacitated as a 
result of the incidents of harassment, engaged in an "an extraordinarily 
active travel and social life".60  In sanctioning the Plaintiff’s attorney 
under Rule 11, relating to an attorney’s duty to avoid frivolous filings, 
61 the Court stated that “plaintiff's lawyer should be roundly 
embarrassed.  At the very least, he did an extraordinarily poor job of 
client intake in not learning highly material information about his client, 
. . .”62  Here we see an attorney sanctioned under Federal Rule 11 for a 
failure to Google social media in client intake. Margaret DiBianca 
 
59 Peter Segrist, How the Rise of Big Data and Predictive Analytics Are 
Changing the Attorney's Duty of Competence, 16 N.C. J.L. & 
TECH. 527, 605 (2015) (“It has also been suggested that there is an 
affirmative obligation for attorneys to inquire into social networking 
information that may hold potential relevance in a given matter.”). 
60 Id. 
61 Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. The text of Rule 11 provides in relevant part: 
 
 Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party 
represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one 
attorney . . . The signature of an attorney or party 
constitutes a certificate by the signer that the signer has 
read the pleading, motion or other paper, that to the best 
of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief 
formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in 
fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith 
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of 
existing law...  
 
For an excellent summary of Rule 11, see Julia K. Cowles, Rule 
11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Duty to 
Withdraw a Baseless Pleading, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 697 
(1988).  
62 Id. See also Donna Bader, Have You Googled Your Clients Lately?, 
AN APPEAL TO REASON (Sept. 11, 2012), 
http://www.anappealtoreason.com/home/2012/9/11/have-you-googled-
your-clients-lately.html. 
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concluded that “Naysayers and late adopters alike may be equally 
surprised to learn that ignoring social media altogether may constitute a 
violation of their ethical obligations.”63 
 
Relatedly, an attorney has a Duty to Google a client she cannot 
locate.  A New Jersey appeals court found that an attorney could not 
withdraw representation from an absent client where she did not make 
diligent efforts to locate the client, including an internet search.64 The 
Alaska Bar Association issued an ethics opinion stating that attorneys 
representing a client in a criminal appeal, where the client cannot be 
contacted,65 must make “reasonable efforts” to contact the client, which 
specifically include an internet search.66 
 
d. The Duty to Google the Jury in Voir Dire 
 
An attorney may have a Duty to Google jurors. This specific area of 
law is developed but somewhat unsettled.67 The genesis of this duty is 
in an attorney’s ability to conduct due diligence on jurors “in order to 
ascertain whether the juror has any bias, opinion, or prejudice that 
would affect or control the fair determination by him of the issues to be 
tried.”68    Googling, obviously, makes this due diligence easy, if 
 
63 Margaret M. DiBianca, Ethical Risks Arising From Lawyers’ Use of 
(and Refusal to Use) Social Media, 12 DEL. L. REV. 179 (2011).  
64 Garrett (formerly Matisa) v. Matisa, 394 N.J. Super. 468, 927 A.2d 
177 (Ch. Div. 2007).  
65 Perhaps a somewhat common problem on the last frontier. 
66 Alaska Bar Ass’n Ethics Op. 2011-4, “Duties of an Attorney in a 
Criminal Appeal when the Client Cannot be Contacted” (2011) (Alaska 
Op. 2011-4).  
67 For an excellent discussion of the birth of the Duty to Google as it 
relates to jurors, see J.C. Lundberg, Googling Jurors to Conduct Voir 
Dire, 8 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 123 (2012).  Lundberg notes that  
“[t]he growing efficacy of the Internet as a tool for conducting jury 
research has far outpaced the development of guidelines for its use, 
leaving Internet-based jury research in an ambiguous position”). Id. at 
125. 
68 Id. at 130, citing Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 415 (1991). 
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perhaps imprecise. Googling jurors is now common.69 One article 
quotes a state judge in Florida as having an “unspoken expectation” that 
attorneys will research jurors before and during a case, because such 
research is part of an attorney’s duty of competence.70 
 
One notable case illustrates the complexity of this practice. In 
Johnson v. McCullough,71 an attorney on appeal in a medical 
malpractice case argued that a juror in the trial court had lied during 
voir dire, when asked if he had ever been a party to a lawsuit.72  The 
attorney discovered this falsehood by searching for the juror on 
Missouri’s automated court record system, Case.net.73  The Court 
bristled at the idea of attorneys searching for juror information after a 
case to undermine a verdict, and issued a ruling requiring attorneys to 
affirmatively search for information about jurors on Case.net before 
trial, because such attorneys “now have a free and potentially easy 
means to search a prospective juror’s litigation experience.”74 who fail 
to perform such a search risk waiving the ability to argue juror 
nondisclosure in voir dire on appeal.75  That is to say that attorneys are 
not just permitted to Google jurors. They are required to Google jurors 
to preserve a right on appeal.76  
 
 
69 See John G. Browning, As Voir Dire Becomes Voir Google, Where 
Are the Ethical Lines Drawn, 25 THE JURY EXPERT 3 (May 2013). 
70 Ben Hancock, Should You ‘Facebook’ the Jury? Yes. No. Probably, 
THE RECORDER (Apr. 26, 2017), 
http://www.therecorder.com/id=1202784626601/Should-You-
Facebook-the-Jury-Yes-No-Probably. 
71 306 S.W.3d 551 (Mo. 2010) (en banc). 
72 306 S.W.3d at 554. 
73 Id. 
74 John Constance, Note, Attorney Duty to Search Case.net for Juror 
Nondisclosure: Missouri Supreme Court Rule 69.025, 76 MO. L. REV. 
493, 494 (2010). 
75 Johnson, 306 S.W.3d at 554. 
76 Lundberg, supra note 67, at 132 (“In Johnson v. McCullough, the 
Supreme Court of Missouri created a limited duty for lawyers to 
research members of the venire.”). 
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Similarly, in a personal injury case,77 attorneys for a defendant 
discovered after a trial that jurors had misrepresented prior involvement 
in litigation, and used that misrepresentation as a basis for appeal. The 
court rejected this argument and stated that the attorney should have 
discovered that information during voir dire, and that such internet 
searches constitute “reasonable diligence.”78  
 
In a 2012 case in federal court in New York, the court denied a 
motion for a new trial where a party’s attorneys “had a suspicion that 
Juror No. 1 was not the person she represented herself to be during voir 
dire” which “leavened into tangible evidence that [the juror] was a 
monstrous liar.”79 Specifically, the juror in question lied during voir 
dire that she was an attorney with a suspended license based in some 
part on alcohol dependency. The court concluded that the juror would 
have been excluded for cause if these facts were known, but that the 
attorneys “knew—or with a modicum of diligence would have known—
of [the juror’s] misconduct before the jury rendered its verdict.” 
(emphasis mine).  
 
The American Bar Association’s Standing Committee on Ethics and 
Professional Responsibility issued a Formal Opinion stating that it is 
acceptable for attorneys to research prospective jurors on the internet 
and/or through social media, provided that the attorneys do not make 
any sort of “active” contact with the targets of their research, such as 
“friending” or “following” them (and as long as such research is not 
prohibited by law or court order).80 There, the ABA noted in a footnote:  
  
 While this Committee does not take a position on whether the 
standard of care for competent lawyer performance requires 
 
77 Burden v. CSX Transp., Inc., No. 08–cv–04–DRH, 2011 WL 
3793664, at 9 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 24, 2011).  
78 Id.  
79 U.S. v. Daugerdas, 867 F.Supp. 2d 445 (2012).  
80 ABA COMM. ON ETHICS & PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, FORMAL OP. 14-
466  “Lawyer Reviewing Jurors’ Internet Presence” (2014); see also Jo 
Dale Carothers, Are Pins, Posts, Tweets and Likes Appropriate for Use 
in Selecting Jurors, THE IP LAW BLOG (Apr. 1, 2016), 
http://www.theiplawblog.com/2016/04/articles/privacy/are-pins-posts-
tweets-and-likes-appropriate-for-use-in-selecting-jurors/.  
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using Internet research to locate information about jurors that 
is relevant to the jury selection process, we are also mindful 
... that a lawyer ‘should keep abreast of changes in the law 
and its practice, including the benefits and risks associated 
with relevant technology.’81 
 
The bar associations of New York, New Hampshire and Pennsylvania 
have issued similar opinions, though these opinions do not so much 
establish a bright-line rule as they analogize jurors to opposing parties 
with respect to the permissiveness of contact.82 A district judge in the 
Eastern District of Texas has issued a standing order providing for 
guidelines for the internet research of jurors, prohibiting active 
communication such as “friending” but allowing for passive 
communication such a profile viewing, noting that in so doing “[t]he 
Court recognizes the duty imposed on diligent parties to secure as much 
useful information as possible about venire members. . . .”83  
 
In the closest formal rule with respect to a Duty to Google to date, 
shortly after the Johnson decision, the Missouri Supreme Court adopted 
Rule 69.025 (effective January 1, 2011), which addresses juror 
nondisclosure, which states in relevant part: 
 
    (b) Reasonable Investigation. For purposes of this Rule 
69.025, a 'reasonable investigation' means review of Case.net 
before the jury is sworn. 
 
81 ABA Formal Op. 14-466, at 2, n.3.  
82 See NYCLA Formal Opinion No 743 (2011); N. H. Bar Ass’n, Op. 
2012-13/05 (Stating an attorney’s “general duty to be aware of social 
media as a source of potentially useful information in litigation, to be 
competent to obtain that information directly or through an agent”); Pa. 
Bar Ass’n, Formal Op. 2014-300 (2014). 
83 STANDING ORDER REGARDING RESEARCH AS TO POTENTIAL JURORS IN 
ALL CASES ASSIGNED TO U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE RODNEY GILSTRAP, at 2 
(Jan. 25, 2017), 
http://www.txed.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/judgeFiles/Standing%2
0Order%20--%20Juror%20Research%20%28signed%29.pdf.  The 
order permits an attorney’s passive viewing of a juror’s social media 
profile even if, because of a privacy setting, the juror can see that an 
attorney viewed her profile. Id.  
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… 
(e) Waiver. A party waives the right to seek relief based 
on juror nondisclosure if the party fails to do either of the 
following before the jury is sworn: 
  … 
(1) Conduct a reasonable investigation… 
 
But this rule by no means settled the issue. In a later opinion in King v. 
Sorensen, the Missouri Supreme Court stated that “[w]hile Rule 
69.025(b) specifically requires Case.net searches of prospective jurors, 
it neither specifies the extent of an attorney's research obligation nor 
instructs how searches are to be conducted.” This was an issue in that 
particular case because an attorney’s search for information about a 
juror was deemed by a lower court to be insufficient, but the court 
provided the attorney with the incorrect name of the juror. At issue was 
whether the attorney had a duty to search variants of the juror’s name. 
In concluding that the attorney’s reliance on the court was reasonable, 
the Court in King wearily observed that  “No Missouri court has 
addressed the issue of what type of ‘review of Case.net’ will be deemed 
‘reasonable investigation’ with regard to Rule 69.025.”84 
 
 Subsequently, Missouri appellate courts have noted that the standard 
for researching jurors on the internet is not one of perfection and 
omniscience, stating that it cannot be the rule that “any and all 
research—Internet based or otherwise—into  a juror's alleged material 
nondisclosure must be performed and brought to the attention of the 
trial court before the jury is empaneled or the complaining party waives 
the right to seek relief from the trial court.”85 Instead, Missouri courts 
seem in agreement with the rather nebulous rule that “that the day may 
come that technological advances may compel our Supreme Court to re-
think the scope of required ‘reasonable investigation’ into the 
background of jurors that may impact challenges to the veracity of 
responses given in voir dire before the jury is empaneled — [but] that 
day has not arrived as of yet.”86   
 
84 King v. Sorensen, 532 S.W.3d 209 (2017). 
85 Khoury v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 368 S.W.3d 189, 202 (Mo.App. 
2012). 
86 Spence v. BNSF Ry. Co., 2016 Mo. App. LEXIS 1338; Khoury, 368 
S.W.3d at 202. 
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That conclusion does not inspire confidence in the current state of 
guidance with respect to a Duty to Google. While the ABA may not be 
imposing an affirmative obligation, the sanctions attorneys have faced 
in cases such as Johnson suggest that an attorney’s obligation is more 
than a wise choice – it seems like a requirement.87  
  
e. Conclusion 
 
The Duty to Google is growing as, it seems, a common law duty 
where an attorney must diligently choose to – and as the Cannedy case 
shows, know how to – use an internet search to obtain facts about a 
matter.  What these cases all have in common is that they extended an 
attorney’s duty of fact collection, and in so doing did not point to a 
specific rule, requirement or even a guideline that internet research was 
now warranted.  What is concerning about all of them is that the 
attorneys involved violated a duty to their client that they may not have 
known existed until after they violated it.  
 
It is clear from these cases that a technological revolution is 
changing the way attorneys must research their work. But is the Duty to 
Google just another example of how attorneys must become proficient 
in technology to meet their professional ethical obligations? What kind 
of professional duty is it?  And when should it arise? These questions 
form the basis of the next part of this Article.  
II. THE LOGICAL HOME OF THE DUTY TO GOOGLE 
a.The Sources of the Duty to Google 
 
 Though it is not at entirely clear from the cases discussed in Part I, it 
seems as if the attorneys who found themselves in trouble through 
insufficient digital searches violated a professional duty to investigate 
the matters on which they worked. A brief discussion of the possible 
sources of this duty is thus illuminative.  
 
 Specifically, the attorney’s duty to investigate arises most 
 
87 Id. at 203-204 (noting that litigators are “arguably” required to use 
social media as part of voir dire).  
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prominently in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. However, it 
has been most developed in a line of capital criminal defense cases as 
part of an argument on appeal that a criminal defense attorney’s conduct 
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. It also arises in the 
malpractice context, as a potential source of an attorney’s failure to 
adequately represent her client. These sources are discussed below. 
  
i. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct  
 
The Duty to Google perhaps fits most snugly as an outgrowth to 
commentary language in Rule 1.1 of the Model Rules, dealing with 
attorney competence.88 This rule states that “A lawyer shall provide 
competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires 
the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably 
necessary for the representation.”89  Competent representation includes 
“inquiry into and analysis of the factual and legal elements of the 
problem and the use of methods and procedures meeting the standards 
of competent practitioners.”90   In 2012, the ABA added language a 
Comment to this Rule requiring that a lawyer stay abreast of “relevant 
technology,” tying that requirement to the duty of competence.91  
 
88 See, e.g., Perlman, supra note 17, at 24 (“Lawyers no longer need to 
rely exclusively on private investigators to uncover a wealth of factual 
information about a legal matter. Lawyers can learn a great deal from 
simple Internet searches. Lawyers ignore this competency at their 
peril.”).  
89 9 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (Am. Bar Assoc. 2016).  
90 Id. at cmt. 5.  
91  Id. at cmt. 8 (emphasis added). See also Michael Murphy, Just and 
Speedy: On Civil Discovery Sanctions for Luddite Lawyers, 25 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 36 (2017). For a full discussion of this language, see 
Lori D. Johnson, Navigating Technology Competence in Transactional 
Practice, 65 VILL. L. REV. 159 (2020).  There, Johnson notes that “[t]he 
Commission suggested that a duty of technological competence was 
already implicitly encompassed in Rule 1.1, but it had now decided to 
make ‘explicit’ the duty to understand the ‘benefits and risks’ of 
relevant technology.” Id. at 168, citing ABA COMM’N ON ETHICS 
20/20, INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 1 (2012), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/eth- 
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Therefore an attorney must have the technological competence to 
understand modern methods of collecting factual information, and then 
must employ those methods to discover relevant facts about a matter, 
her client, any witnesses, and even prospective jurors. To date, 38 states 
have passed rules requiring attorneys licensed in that state to adhere to 
the these technological competency standards.92 Florida and North 
Carolina now require attorneys to take yearly technology CLE classes in 
the same way most states require yearly ethics or mental health CLE 
classes.93  
 
There is obvious breadth in a rule of professional conduct that 
applies to every aspect of an attorney’s work.  Further, cases invoking 
the Duty to Google have generally referenced the attorney’s failures in 
those cases as a failure of “competence.”94 That being said, caselaw and 
commentary points to other potential sources of the Duty to Google, 
which the rest of this section will discuss. 
 
ii. Effective Assistance of Counsel Standards in the Criminal 
Defense Context 
 
An attorney’s duty to investigate matters is has evolved in an 
instructive way in the capital criminal defense context.95 A long and 
 
ics_2020/20120508_ethics_20_20_final_hod_introdution_and_overvie
w_report .pdf. 
92 Heidi Frostestad Kuehl, Technologically Competent: Ethical Practice 
for 21st Century Lawyering, 10 CASE W. RES. J.L. TECH. & INTERNET 1, 
6 (2019); Johnson, supra note 12, at 186. 
93 Kuehl, supra note 92, at 26 n. 177, citing Bob Ambrogi, North 
Carolina Becomes Second State to Mandate Technology Training for 
Lawyers, LAWSITES (Dec. 5, 2018), 
https://www.lawsitesblog.com/2018/12/northcarolina- 
becomes-second-state-mandate-technology-training-lawyers.html. 
94 See, e.g., Griffin v. Maryland, 192 Md. App. 518 (2010); Cannedy v. 
Adams, 2009 WL 3711958 at 280 (C.D. Cal. 2009). 
95 John H. Blume & Stacey D. Neumann, It's Like Deja Vu all over 
again: Williams v. Taylor, Wiggins v. Smith, Rompilla v. Beard and a 
(Partial) Return to the Guidelines Approach to the Effective Assistance 
of Counsel, 34 AM. J. CRIM. L. 127 (2007) (Noting that the duty to 
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detailed progression of cases exists interpreting whether an attorney’s 
investigation in a capital case violated the ABA Standards for 
ineffective assistance of counsel, a standard that has essentially (if 
debatably) been adopted by courts.96 In a 1984 case Strickland v. 
Washington, the Supreme Court cited the ABA standards and noted that 
“counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a 
reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.”97 
Subsequently, the issue of adequate investigation by defense counsel in 
capital cases has received attention in scholarship and by courts.98 That 
attention expanded outside of capital cases and into other criminal 
cases. Today, the ABA guidelines with respect to criminal investigation 
include a specific description of a defense attorney’s duty to investigate. 
ABA Standard 4-4.1 (“Duty to Investigate and Engage Investigators”) 
provides that criminal defense attorneys have a duty to investigate the 
 
investigate is “the most heavily scrutinized aspect of defense counsel's 
representation” in ineffective assistance of counsel cases); Kenneth 
Williams, Ensuring the Capital Defendant's Right to Competent 
Counsel: It's Time for Some Standards!, 51 WAYNE L. REV. 129, 153 
(2005) (Stating that “t]he most basic duty that an attorney has in any 
[capital] case is to conduct an investigation.”); Blume & Neumann, 
supra note 95, at 138 (“the attorney who is ineffective in the 
investigative phase might never be able to rectify her performance and 
provide her client with an adequate defense.”). 
96 Robert R. Rigg, The T-Rex without Teeth: Evolving Strickland v. 
Washington and the Test for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 35 PEPP. 
L. REV. 77 (2007); see also Emily Olson-Gault, Reclaiming Van Hook: 
Using the ABA's Guidelines and Resources to Establish Prevailing 
Professional Norms, 46 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1279 (2018) (noting that the 
guidelines “have been cited favorably by courts in more than 350 
reported opinions, adopted in substantive part by at least ten capital 
jurisdictions.”). 
97 Id. at 80-81, citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688-89 
(1984). 
98 Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for 
the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835 (1994) 
(Collecting cases showing widespread inadequate investigation by 
criminal defense counsel in capital case); Rigg, supra note 96, at 88 
(describing a series of cases in the early 2000s).  
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sufficiency of the factual basis for the criminal charges their clients 
face.99 One court notes that "[a]n attorney's performance is deficient 
when he or she fails to conduct any investigation into exculpatory 
evidence and has not provided any explanation for not doing so."100  
 
In a later case the Court interpreted the ABA guidelines to include a 
 
99 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE DEFENSE FUNCTION,  
Standard Nos. 4-1.1 (Am. Bar Ass’n, 4th ed. 2017), 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/standards/Defens
eFunctionFourthEdition/. The relevant sections of the standard read, in 
their entirety:  
 
Standard 4-4.1 Duty to Investigate and Engage Investigators 
 
(a) Defense counsel has a duty to investigate in all cases, and to 
determine whether there is a sufficient factual basis for criminal 
charges. 
. . .  
(c) Defense counsel’s investigative efforts should commence 
promptly and should explore appropriate avenues that reasonably 
might lead to information relevant to the merits of the matter, 
consequences of the criminal proceedings, and potential 
dispositions and penalties. Although investigation will vary 
depending on the circumstances, it should always be shaped by 
what is in the client’s best interests, after consultation with the 
client. Defense counsel’s investigation of the merits of the 
criminal charges should include efforts to secure relevant 
information in the possession of the prosecution, law enforcement 
authorities, and others, as well as independent investigation. 
Counsel’s investigation should also include evaluation of the 
prosecution’s evidence (including possible re-testing or re-
evaluation of physical, forensic, and expert evidence) and 
consideration of inconsistencies, potential avenues of 
impeachment of prosecution witnesses, and other possible 
suspects and alternative theories that the evidence may raise. 
100 Rigg, supra note 96, at 90, n95, citing Stevens v. Del. Corr. Ctr., 152 
F. Supp. 2d 561, 576-77 (D. Del. 2001). 
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reasonability requirement, stating that "[t]he ABA Guidelines provide 
that investigations into mitigating evidence 'should comprise efforts to 
discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence and evidence to 
rebut any aggravating evidence that may be introduced by the 
prosecutor.'”101  Notably, the ABA Guidelines became more specific 
over time and as courts interpreted them as a standard for the 
reasonableness of an investigation.102 Courts then use the ABA 
Guidelines to help determine and define the “prevailing professional 
norms’ in ineffective assistance cases.”103 Later cases have noted that 
courts must examine an investigation, in particular a decision not to 
investigate, for “reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a 
heavy measure of deference to counsel's judgments.”104  
 
 
iii. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
  
  As the failure of the attorney to investigate his own client’s social 
media in the Cajamarca case showed, the Duty to Google may find its 
way into the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, at Rule 11. FRCP 11 
requires that an attorney make a reasonable inquiry to determine that the 
arguments in a filed document are not frivolous.105 Therefore at least a 
cursory internet search is required for an attorney to sign a pleading 
motion or other legal paper in good faith that such filing is not being 
advanced for an improper purpose. There the attorney must make a 
“reasonable inquiry” to build information and belief of proper purpose.   
 
The Duty to Google could also find its way into the Federal Rules 
regarding discovery. The Duty to Google is a failure of fact collection, 
but it is probably not a discovery violation of data collection in that the 
party failing to Google failed to collect, preserve and produce relevant 
information within its possession, custody or control, as prescribed by 
 
101 Id. at 91, n105, citing Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003). 
102 Id. at 93 (“Later, and current, ABA Guidelines relating to death 
penalty defense are even more explicit…”). 
103 Id. at 95, citing Hamblin v. Mitchell, 354 F.3d 482, 486 (6th Cir. 
2003). 
104 Id. at 96-97, citing In re Lucas, 133.94 P.3d 477, 502 (Cal. 2004). 
105 FED. R. CIV. P. 11. 
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the Rules.106  This is so because the information is, of course, publicly 
available, and thus available to the other side as well.107 The duty is 
more of a failure of zealous advocacy, of taking advantage of readily 
available technology to build provide the best possible representation to 
a client.   
 
At least, that is the takeaway from a survey of cases where the 
“Duty to Google” has arisen.  None of these have taken the formal step 
to codify the duty. Such rule, however it would be presented, would be 
a fairly strong reflection of “the concept that the proper use of 
technological advances is part of an attorney’s duty of competence.”108  
 
iv. Malpractice or Agency Law 
 
George Cohen notes that “other law may impose on lawyers a duty 
to investigate,” citing malpractice law and agency law.109 Cohen 
observes that these sources of a duty of investigate hinge off of the 
 
106 See FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a) and R. 45(a), which obligate a party 
responding to a document request or subpoena to produce “documents, 
electronically stored information, and tangible things” in that party's 
possession, custody, or control.” See also Evan E. North, Facebook 
Isn’t Your Space Anymore: Discovery of Social Networking Websites, 
58 U. KAN. L. REV., 1279-1309, 1303 (2010) (“In other e-discovery and 
traditional discovery cases, courts have held that documents are within a 
party’s control if the party has a legal right to obtain the documents.”).   
107 See, e.g. Valenzuela v. Smith, 04 Civ. 0900, 2006 WL 403842 at *2 
(E.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2006) (“Defendants . . . will not be compelled to 
produce documents that are equally available to plaintiff.”); Baum v. 
Village of Chittenango, 218 F.R.D. 36, 40-41 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) 
(“[C]ompelling discovery from another is unnecessary when the 
documents sought are equally accessible to all.”). 
108 See, e.g., Catherine J. Lanctot, Becoming A Competent 21st Century 
Legal Ethics Professor: Everything You Always Wanted to Know About 
Technology (But Were Afraid to Ask), 2015 PROF. LAW. 75, 82-83. 
109 George M. Cohen, The State of Lawyer Knowledge under the Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct, 3 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 115, 122 (2014),  
citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 52 cmt. 
C (2000) and RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.11(1) (2006). 
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professional rules of Rule 11.110 That is so because these sources arise 
as part of a negligence claim based on an attorney acting as a fiduciary 
to the client, which carries with it a duty of competent representation.111 
It is likely, then, that a charge of malpractice for the violation of the 
Duty to Google would be in addition to, not instead of, a violation of a 
rule of professional conduct or Rule 11.  
III. THE VARIOUS TRIGGERS FOR THE DUTY TO GOOGLE  
 With the Duty to Google’s sources in mind, we can look to when an 
attorney should observe it. Those instances would, of course, shape any 
rule, even if they are compiled into a nonexclusive example list. The 
following subsections look to the likely incidences where the Duty to 
Google should arise, based on the cases discussed previously and other, 
new examples. 
  
a.  Location of Witnesses, Defendants, and Parties 
 
The Duty to Google should certainly exist where attorneys seek to 
show that they performed a diligent search for the location of witnesses 
or absent parties.112  It makes sense that an attorney would need to use 
any readily available technology when searching for a participant in a 
suit, particularly since this duty is so closely tied to the attorney’s duty 
of candor to the tribunal.  The extent of that search, of course, should be 
reasonable to the importance of the party or witness to the case, and the 
resources at hand.  
 
b.  Facts in Dispute  
 
Googling verifiable facts in dispute in litigation also seems 
commonsensical.113 It certainly should be required by attorneys at the 
beginning of a case as part of their ethical duty to verify the facts 
 
110 Id.  
111 Ellie Margolis, Surfin' Safari - Why Competent Lawyers Should 
Research on the Web, 10 YALE J.L. & TECH. 82, 103 (2007-2008). 
112 See Munster v. Groce, Dubois v. Butler, and Weatherly v. Optimum 
Asset Mgmt., supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
113 See Cannedy v. Adams and Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Wright supra 
notes 5, 6 and accompanying text. 
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asserted in legal pleadings.  With the internet an ever-present tool used 
by most working professionals, it must be used to check factual 
assertions.  The Duty to Google facts in a pleading could even be 
included in Rule 11. How much googling is a tougher issue. Should an 
attorney search to verify every fact, or just key facts? The extent of an 
attorney’s duty to investigate the facts of a claim has been discussed by 
the ABA as depending on any number of factors, including: 
 
…the nature or complexity of the claims or contentions to be 
investigated or developed, the time in which the investigation 
must be conducted, the resources available to the lawyer to 
conduct the investigation, the availability and cooperation of 
potential fact and expert witnesses, whether expert witnesses must 
be consulted, the availability of evidence that can be obtained 
without formal discovery, whether any investigation has been 
conducted prior to the lawyer undertaking the representation, the 
existence of parallel proceedings that complicate or expedite 
matters, and probably more.114 
 
Internet searches fit into these factors in a number of ways. For one, a 
basic internet search should be a resource available to almost every 
attorney, and should be able to be performed in little time.  Therefore, 
the extent of the search rests on the nature and complexity of the claims.  
In a complex case with expert testimony and many “moving parts,” it 
may be prudent or an attorney to use an investigator or research service 
to conduct an extremely comprehensive search.115  These professional 
 
114 DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, BRIAN SHANNON FAUGHNAN, & MICHAEL 
M. MATULA, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN LITIGATION (ABA 
2016) at 4. 
115 A new profession has emerged of “digital private investigators”, who 
specialize in using internet searches and databases to collect 
information. See, e.g., Digital Private Investigators and Family Law, 
FOURINER LAW FIRM BLOG (May 29, 2016),  
http://fournierlawoffice.com/blog/digital-private-investigators-and-
family-law/ (“Digital private investigators used for family law in 
Tallahassee commonly track websites to determine whether an 
individual has a presence. It’s very common for private investigators to 
scour personal advertisement sites, escort sites, even dating sites to 
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searches can include searching web sites and comments sections, social 
media, and “reverse image searches,” in which a searcher searches for a 
picture to find more specific images from a point in time.116 These 
methods may be outside of an attorney’s knowledge, but if the 
attorney’s investigation warrants such methods, the attorney has a duty 
to contract with professionals who can capably perform the search.117  
 
This duty should extend through a case, though understandably it 
should relax over time, as testimony and evidence builds into a res 
gestae.  Nevertheless, a prudent attorney would set automatic reminder 
and perform regular searches to make sure no new material surfaces.  
 
Next, the Duty to Google exists for both parties as part of their 
responsibility to cooperate in discovery, if only because parties are 
strongly encouraged to eliminate disputes over facts and stipulate to 
facts.118  Using internet technology to narrow the facts of a case by 
finding objective, verifiable information to which parties can stipulate 
will be a welcome development for courts and clients. It is said that 
parties should ask judges to take judicial notice of facts more often.119 
 
determine whether an individual has an email address associated with a 
profile. This information can be used in divorces to substantiate other 
information in suspected adultery cases.”) 
116 Id. 
117 This duty is explicit in an attorney’s duty of technological 
competence.  See, e.g., Cal. State Bar, Formal Op. 2015-193 (2015) at 
4. (Addressing attorney technological competence in e-discovery and 
noting that to satisfy an attorney’s duty of technological competence the 
attorney “must try to acquire sufficient learning or skill, or associate or 
consult with someone with the necessary expertise to assist.”). 
118 See generally William Matthewman, Towards a New Paradigm for 
E-Discovery in Civil Litigation: A Judicial Perspective, 71 FLA. L. REV. 
1261 (2019) (Discussing changes to the Federal Rules designed to 
increase cooperation among opposing parties in discovery).  
119 Judicial notice is the act of a allows a court ruling on the acceptance 
of a proposition without presented evidence of that proposition’s 
veracity. FED. R. EVID. 201; see, e.g.,  Paul J. Kiernan, Better Living 
Through Judicial Notice, LITIG. (Fall 2009), at 1, 3.   
DUTY TO GOOGLE 8/27/2020  4:03 PM 
  
 
28 
 
The Duty to Google can be a key tool in that process.120 
 
c. Criminal Defendants 
 
It is likely that an attorney has a Duty to Google her own criminal 
defendant client, as part of her general duty to research aspects of the 
prosecution of her client.121 This standard does not, however, go into 
much detail about the extent of the duty to investigate. It states that 
“investigation will vary depending on the circumstances” and “should 
always be shaped by what is in the client’s best interests, after 
consultation with the client.”122 While vague as to extent, this standard 
does point to an affirmative duty for an attorney to investigate factual 
aspects of a criminal case. The standard does, however, note certain 
areas of factual investigation, such as obtaining prosecutorial evidence 
and law enforcement evidence.123 And of course, there are cases 
discussed previously that have found instances of ineffective assistance 
of counsel where the defense attorney did not conduct an electronic 
investigation.124  
 
d.  Parties to a Transaction  
 
The Wright case’s Nigerian prince taught an attorney a lesson that 
all transactional attorneys should heed – the Duty to Google certainly 
extends into the transactional side of practice.125 A transactional 
attorney should, for example, Google all sides of a negotiation for a 
proposed transaction, especially if one or more of those sides is an 
 
120 The use of Google in particular to make judicial notice more 
prevalent is well-asserted in a 2014 article. See Bellin and Guthrie 
Ferguson, supra note 1, at 1137, citing Richard A. Posner, REFLECTIONS 
ON JUDGING, 141–142 (2013) (“The Internet is not going away. The 
quality and quantity of online material that illuminates the issues in 
federal litigation will only grow. Judges must not ignore such a rich 
mine of information.”).  
121 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE DEFENSE FUNCTION,  
Standard Nos. 4-1.1, supra note 99. 
122 Id.  
123 Id. 
124 Cannedy, supra note 5.  
125 See Wright, supra note 6 and accompanying text.  
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unfamiliar entity.  Indeed, the Duty to Google can and should extend to 
material representations made during negotiations, to the extent such 
representations are reasonably verifiable through an internet search.  
 
e.     Social Media 
 
Relatedly, this Duty to Google facts should extend to the social 
media profiles of parties and witnesses (and of course additional parties 
to a transaction), with the immediate and important caveat that attorneys 
performing social media searches adhere to the growing body of law 
that restricts what attorneys can do to collect social media 
information.126   
 
One consideration with respect to social media information is its 
reliability.  While such information is generally treated as admissible, 
provided it is not hearsay,127 a growing sentiment online is that a 
person’s social media profile puts forth self-created (and perhaps 
 
126 Saleel V. Sabnis, Attorney Ethics in the Age of Social Media, 
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (June 8, 2016),  
http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/professional/articles/s
pring2016-0616-attorney-ethics-age-social-media.html, citing the New 
York State Bar’s Committee on Professional Ethics, Opinion 843 
(2010), (Stating that an attorney may research a party’s social media 
profiles provided that the attorney refrains from taking steps to “friend” 
the party or otherwise view nonpublic pages not accessible to all 
members in the social media platform); Philadelphia Bar Association 
Professional Guidance Committee Opinion 2009-02 (2009) (Stating that 
an attorney may not use a third party or proxy to “friend” a witness to 
view private social media information, such a practice is deceptive); Bar 
Association of the City of New York Committee on Professional Ethics, 
Formal Opinion 2010-2 (2010), (Contradicting these opinions and 
stating that it is ethical for an attorney to “friend” a third party as long 
as the attorney did so without using false pretenses); Oregon State Bar 
in Formal Opinion 2013-189 (2013) (same). 
127 Tamara A. O’Connell, Is that @Social Media Evidence 
#admissible?, JOSEPH, GREENWALD & LAKE, LLC (Jan. 24, 2014), 
http://www.jgllaw.com/blog/social-media-evidence-admissible, citing 
Griffin v. State, 419 Md. 343, 351, 19 A.3d 415 (2011).  
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idealized) picture of that person’s life, and for that reason is inherently 
unreliable. 128  Therefore the Duty to Google and discover social media 
information carries with it a duty to evaluate that information’s 
reliability.  
 
f.  Professional Opinions 
 
There is, somewhat obviously, a duty to investigate with an attorney 
is engaged in issuing an opinion, such as an opinion letter, based on 
underling facts.129 George Cohen notes that “[l]egal duties of inquiry 
imposed are perhaps most developed for securities lawyers,” 
particularly with respect to the issuance of materials to investors.130 
This duty would be tied very directly to the duty of competence – an 
attorney who provides an opinion letter based on unverified facts is 
gambling, at least.   
 
g. Clients 
 
An attorney has a Duty to Google her own client, particularly to 
 
128 R. Kay Green, The Social Media Effect: Are You Really Who You 
Portray Online?, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 3, 2013), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/r-kay-green/the-social-media-effect-
a_b_3721029.html; Kathleen Burge, Overblown Facebook Personas 
Can Leave Friends Deflated, BOSTON GLOBE (Sept. 29, 2014), 
https://www.bostonglobe.com/lifestyle/style/2014/09/29/our-facebook-
profiles-create-people-want-ideal-versions-
ourselves/rM1vIs9JB2e3OYkKSvGwUM/story.html (“Facebook and 
other social media allow users to present a curated self, showing friends 
or the public a happier or more accomplished version of a person.”).  A 
related issue involves the ability for a user to post a fictitious social 
media account masquerading as someone else, with relative ease. See, 
e.g., Griffin, supra note 127 at 19 A.3d 415, 421 (2011) (Citing the high 
“potential for fabricating or tampering with electronically stored 
information on a social networking site”). 
129 George M. Cohen, The State of Lawyer Knowledge under the Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct, 3 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 115, 128-129 
(2014).. 
130 Id. at 129.  
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verify the facts represented to her by that Client.131 Joel Cohen 
investigated examples of this phenomenon in an article the New York 
Law Journal and mused: 
 
Must lawyers "Google" their (prospective) clients to learn 
"who" they're dealing with—meaning how reliable they're 
likely to be? Shouldn't lawyers research their clients' 
claims by not only looking at the information provided by 
the client, but by making sure it makes sense; that 
documents fit with the client's story and other information 
received? The rules seem to require it… 
 
For example, George Cohen notes that the ABA issued an opinion on 
“Client Due Diligence, Money Laundering, and Terrorist Financing” in 
which it stated that “It would be prudent for lawyers to undertake Client 
Due Diligence ("CDD") in appropriate circumstances to avoid 
facilitating illegal activity or being drawn unwittingly into a criminal 
activity.”132 Cohen notes that the duty to investigate arises in many 
contexts: 
 
Other ethical duties that a lawyer owes to a client may also 
imply a duty to investigate in certain circumstances. These 
duties include the duty to communicate with the client, to 
seek a client's informed consent,  to avoid conflicts of 
interest, to "exercise independent judgment and render 
candid advice," or to determine a non-frivolous basis in fact 
and law for bringing or defending against a civil claim.133 
 
The ABA noted that an attorney presenting false information to the tribunal 
runs afoul of  Model Rule 3.3 “Candor Toward the Tribunal,” and that “it 
is reasonable to note that pressure is mounting from the government to 
increase private lawyers' obligation of due diligence in representation of 
 
131 Joel Cohen, The Lawyer’s Duty to Check Facts, NEW YORK L. J. 
(Feb. 9, 2015), 
http://www.stroock.com/siteFiles/Publications/NewYorkLawJournal.pd
f.   
132 George Cohen, supra note 129, at 126-127 n. 77, citing ABA Comm. 
on Prof'1 Ethics & Grievances, Formal Op. 13-463 (2013). 
133 George Cohen, supra note 129, at 127 (footnotes omitted). 
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clients as to financial transactions.”134  It does seem as if attorneys cannot 
afford to be ostriches with respect to due diligence of their clients’ conduct.  
 
It is clear that attorneys should do something more than operate on faith 
that the client is telling the truth about who they say they are and what 
they are doing.135 Vendors are already marketing “people search” 
solutions to attorneys to accomplish this goal.136  
 
h.  The Jury Pool 
 
As noted above, there is a growing body of law with respect to the 
appropriateness of Googling jurors in voir dire.137  Proponents of the 
practice argue that a juror’s online presence is unable to misrepresent 
bias the way a juror can while under pressure of questioning in open 
court, while opponents of the practice note that it is tantamount to 
 
134 Dennis A. Rendleman, What to Do When Your Client Lies, 
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION ETHICS IN VIEW (Sept. 2019). 
https://www.americanbar.org/news/abanews/publications/youraba/2019/
september-2019/what-to-do-when-your-client-lies/, citing 9 MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (Am. Bar Assoc. 2016) which states 
at section (a)(3) that “[a] lawyer shall not knowingly [] offer evidence 
that the lawyer knows to be false.” 
135 Richmond, et al., supra note 114 at 3-4 (“…[L]lawyers are obligated 
to undertake some form of preliminary investigation into clients’ 
intended claims and contentions.”). 
136 Jeremy Byellin, Investigate Your Potential Client? It’s More 
Important Than You Think, THOMSON REUTERS PRACTICE OF LAW 
BLOG (July 14, 2016), 
http://blog.legalsolutions.thomsonreuters.com/practice-of-
law/investigate-your-own-client-its-more-important-than-you-may-
think/ (Describing the importance of an attorney conducting due 
diligence via internet search on potential clients and marketing 
“PeopleMap on Westlaw” solution).   
137 See, e.g., Patrick Schweihs & Eric Pesale, Common Ethical Issues To 
Consider When Researching Jurors And Witnesses On Social Media, 
Above the Law (March 14, 2017), 
http://abovethelaw.com/2017/03/common-ethical-issues-to-consider-
when-researching-jurors-and-witnesses-on-social-media/citing.   
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opening the voir dire process beyond questioning under oath and raises 
a host of reliability issues.138 This is one of the few areas in which Rule 
1.1 has been explicitly interpreted to apply to factual investigations. As 
Lauren Kellerhouse noted in the context of searching jurors’ social 
media profiles, “a lawyer who, following Rule 1.1, knows the risks and 
benefits associated with social media, can quickly come to the 
conclusion that not searching social media during voir dire may be 
grounds for a malpractice claim.”139 The prudent attorney should at 
least consider it in serious cases, especially high-stakes civil cases and 
criminal cases, to the extent that juror information is provided to 
attorneys by the court.140  Kellerhouse continues:  
 
 
138 See Zachary Mesenbourg, Voir Dire in the #LOL Society: Jury 
Selection Needs Drastic Updates to Remain Relevant in the Digital Age, 
47 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 459 (2013) (collecting sources and noting a 
tension in commentary). Mesenbourg cites one set of commentators for 
the premise that “lawyers cannot ignore the fact that social media 
affects every single stage of the litigation process, and urges litigators to 
expand juror research to social sites in order to get a full and real profile 
or potential jury members,” Id. At 460 n. 13, citing Stephen P. Laitinen 
& Hilary J. Loynes, Social Media: A New “Must Use” Tool in 
Litigation?, 52 NO. 8 DRI FOR DEF. 16 (Aug. 2010). He then contrasts 
that premise with another commentator who wrote that “lawyers use of 
social media research could have an adverse effect on jurors’ 
perceptions of the legal process in general if they feel as though their 
privacy is invaded – which could also hinder their willingness to be an 
impartial participant in the process,” Id., citing Duncan Stark, Juror 
Investigation: Is In-Courtroom Internet Research Going Too Far?, 7 
WASH. J. L. TECH & ARTS 93, 101 (2011).  Mesenbourg comes to the 
fair conclusion that like it or not, some amount of digital voir dire is 
becoming (or has become) the norm. Id. at 485-486.  
139 Lauren Kellerhouse, Comment 8 of Rule 1.1: The Implications of 
Technological Competence on Investigation, Discovery, and Client 
Security, 40 J. LEGAL PROF. 291, 297 (2016). 
140 See Lundberg, supra note 67, at 125, n.1 (“Multiple decisions have 
imposed some sort of obligation on attorneys to conduct Internet 
research on jurors or members of the venire in order to preserve a 
possible claim of juror misconduct or non-disclosure on appeal.”). 
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Therefore, as it now stands, [ABA Rule 1.1] Comment 8 
does not impose an affirmative duty to search the social 
media accounts of potential jurors during voir dire. 
However, reasonable attorneys can recognize the 
profound benefits that a simple search can bring to the 
process and would be wise to start performing basic 
searches to meet their clients' expectations of using 
technology in their representation.141 
 
i.  And More to Come 
 
The Duty to Google is not limited to these scenarios – they instead 
represent a reflection of current caselaw, or more to the point, of the 
published cases to date in which a trier of fact and/or law determined 
that an attorney should have engaged in an internet search. One can 
spend hours thinking of atypical scenarios in which a particular internet 
search is required. Should an attorney probating a will google death 
notices? Should an attorney handling an immigration case target a 
google search for foreign news for information about her client? Should 
a labor and employment attorney research the social media profiles of 
an employee who threatens a suit?  Unfortunately, we here searching for 
clarity in the Duty to Google may only obtain it a “benchslap” at a time, 
through the continued misfortunes of attorneys who have been chastised 
or sanctions for violating it – even if they did not know the duty they 
were violating until it was too late.  
IV. THE NEBULOUS EXTENT  OF THE DUTY TO GOOGLE  
The Duty to Google does have conceptual limits, rooted historically 
in the duty to investigate. For example, George Cohen has noted that 
statutes or guidelines requiring that an attorney have actual knowledge 
of a certain fact – for instance, whether their client has skipped bail – do 
not necessarily require an investigation, even if a reasonable attorney 
might suspect that fact to be true.142 As Cohen put it, “[m]ost duties to 
investigate [] are created by substantive rules, not by the scienter 
standard.”143 Further, the Strickland Court, allowed for instances in 
which an attorney may rely on a client’s statements with respect to 
 
141 Kellerhouse, supra note 139, at 298. 
142 George Cohen, supra note 129, 125-126. 
143 Id. at 126. 
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reasonably limiting an investigation, noting that "when a defendant has 
given counsel reason to believe that pursuing certain investigations 
would be fruitless or even harmful, counsel's failure to pursue those 
investigations may  not later be challenged as unreasonable."144 
 
The duty may even be more accurately described as normative. As 
Emily Olson-Gault noted, the Guidelines “must not be treated by courts 
as a set of mandatory rules with which counsel must unquestionably 
comply . . . Rather, according to both the Court and the ABA itself, the 
Guidelines were written as a codification of already existing, well-
defined norms of practice.”145 
 
Rulemakers attempting to provide guidance of these norms face a 
tension between the clients’ deserving of a properly technology-savvy 
attorney, and the attorney’s reasonable requirement of a bright-line rule 
of what is sufficient savviness.  This tension is already apparent in the 
consideration of the current rules for attorney technological 
competence, which vaguely require attorneys to keep up with “the 
benefits and risks associated with relevant technology.”146  Attorneys 
are left to follow the rule of thumb that whenever they should be 
searching for information, they should be using the internet. Fine 
advice, but it raises an alarming aspect of the Duty to Google as one of 
degree.  How much Googling is enough, objectively or under the 
circumstances of a case?  
 
As it stands, an attorney using that rule for guidance must consider 
when searching for information about a matter ceases to be a “benefit” – 
at that point, the attorneys should stop.  Somewhat helpfully, in the 
capital case context, the Supreme Court has noted that attorneys need 
not "scour the globe on the off chance something will turn up" and that 
"reasonably diligent counsel may draw a line when they have good 
 
144 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691.  
145 Emily Olson-Gault, Reclaiming Van Hook: Using the ABA's 
Guidelines and Resources to Establish Prevailing Professional Norms, 
46 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1279, 1292 (2018). 
146 Katy Ho, Defining the Contours of an Ethical Duty of Technological 
Competence, 30 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 853, 867-868 (2017) (Noting 
that the current Rule 1.1 does not address “anticipated confusion 
regarding the extent of the duty.”).  
DUTY TO GOOGLE 8/27/2020  4:03 PM 
  
 
36 
 
reason to think further investigation would be a waste."147  However 
outside of that dicta, the existing guidance does not address the extent of 
Googling, just that Googling must occur at various points during a 
representation and more critically, must successfully locate the 
important information.148  There is an allure to simply rely on the 
comfortable language requiring an “inquiry into and analysis of the 
factual and legal elements of the problem and the use of methods and 
procedures meeting the standards of competent practitioners.”149  But in 
a sense this is an ex ante requirement; to satisfy the Duty to Google the 
attorney must find the golden nugget of information. To fail to find the 
nugget is to violate the duty.150 If no nugget exists, no searching is 
required.  Strickland provides an example. There, the Court noted that 
"choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable 
precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support 
the  limitations on investigation."151 
 
This phenomenon has been examined in the legal research context. 
Ellie Margolis, noted that when judges sanction attorneys for inadequate 
searches of legal authority, they do so mainly “. . . based on the 
perception that the authority should have been known, or could have 
been easily found through basic research techniques known to all 
lawyers. Many courts judge the reasonableness of the research by the 
sufficiency of the argument, rather than looking at the research 
itself.”152 
 
 
147 Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 381-382.  
148 See Anna Massoglia, The Voodoo and How-To of Lawyers’ Duty to 
Search the Internet, LAWYERIST.COM (Aug. 8, 2016), 
https://lawyerist.com/104698/voodoo-howto-lawyers-duty-search-
internet/.  
149 9 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (Am. Bar Assoc. 2016) 
at cmt. 5. 
150 See Ho, supra note 146 at 868 (“What happens if an attorney 
mistakenly uses a new technology and gets sanctioned--what additional 
steps should she have taken to avoid a breach in her ethical duty of 
technological competence?”). 
151 Blume & Neumann, supra note 95, quoting Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691 (1984). 
152 Margolis, supra note 111, at 99.  
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George Cohen described the extent of the duty to investigate as 
wide, but not unlimited, and subject to reasonableness:  
 
It is true that any duty to investigate that the lawyer owes to the 
client under the Model Rules is not boundless. The duty to 
investigate is subject to a reasonableness requirement.  Thus, a 
lawyer must calculate whether the likely value of the 
investigation exceeds the costs. The scope of the duty to 
investigate can also be limited by the nature and duration of the 
representation, as well as by specific agreements between the 
client and the lawyer concerning the scope of the 
representation or the type of advice sought.153 
 
Attorneys worried that they are not Googling enough (or at all) and 
taking on risk need some sort of relief. Reliance on judicial opinions is 
reactive, as described above. Knowledge of where a landmine sits is 
much more useful prior to stepping on it. Attorneys could consult their 
state bar for more focused guidance, but reliance on state bar ethical 
opinions is misplaced. Those opinions are tough to find and vary from 
state to state.154 Also, they can lack the dependability of a baseline rule 
from which deviation invites explanation,155 if they are followed at 
all.156  
  
 What current guidance exists mainly in a comment to a model rule 
 
153 George Cohen, supra note 129, at 128. 
154 Bruce A. Green, Bar Association Ethics Committees: Are They 
Broken, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 731, 752 (2002) (noting variance in 
opinions); Lawrence K. Hellman, When Ethics Rules Don't Mean What 
They Say: The Implications of Strained ABA Ethics Opinions, 10 GEO. 
J. LEGAL ETHICS 317, 323-324 (1996). 
155 See, e.g., Lawrence K. Hellman, A Better Way to Make State Legal 
Ethics Opinions, 22 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 973 (1997) (Discusses the 
problems with the current scheme of non-authoritative state ethics 
opinions and offers suggested reforms and value analysis of a 
controlling form of ethics opinions).  
156 Green, supra note 154, at 742 (Noting that a “major criticism of bar 
association ethics committees is that their opinions can be, and are, 
ignored, either by courts, by disciplinary agencies, by lawyers, or by 
some combination of the three.”).  
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of professional conduct. As commentators have noted, states interpret 
comments to the Model Rules (and even the rules themselves) 
inconsistently and quite differently, making the boundaries of 
acceptable conduct even more murky.157 As Peter A. Joy noted, “even 
jurisdictions with an identical ethical rule often interpret and apply the 
rule differently.”158 Multiple states have made changes to the rule, 
though none have specifically discussed an attorney’s duty of 
investigation.159  The current landscape is unclear, at best. Katy Ho put 
it bluntly: “Attorneys cannot fulfill their duty of competence if they do 
not know what it entails.”160  
 
 Elevating the Duty to Google from a comment to a clearly described 
rule makes some sense. While its interpretation may still be murky, it is 
clear from the Duty to Google cases thus far that some, if not many, 
attorneys can use as much guidance as rulemakers can provide. Further, 
the exercise in drafting such a rule would invite and advance the 
development of the professional norm of a “reasonable investigation.” 
Adopting such a rule would also hasten the creation or enhancement of 
a much-needed system of education and communication to the bar 
promoting technological proficiency.   
 
  Technology has changed factual investigation, much in the same 
way that it has changed essentially all of legal practice.161  It is possible 
 
157 Lori D. Johnson, Navigating Technology Competence In 
Transactional Practice, 65 VILL. L. REV. 159, 173 (2020); Hellman, 
Ethics Rules, supra note 154 at 323-324; Hellman, A Better Way, supra 
note 155, at 975-976. 
158 Peter A. Joy, Making Ethics Opinions Meaningful: Toward More 
Effective Regulation of Lawyers' Conduct, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
313, 330 (2002). 
159 Id. at 173. 
160 Ho,  supra note 146 at 869. 
161 Ellie Margolis, Is the Medium the Message? Unleashing the Power 
of E-communication in the Twenty-First Century, 12 LEGAL 
COMMUNICATION & RHETORIC: JAWLD 1, 2 (2015) (“The digital 
revolution is not limited to law, so it is no surprise that the 
legal profession’s reaction to change has mirrored the reaction of 
society at large.”). 
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that the cases above reflect some resistance to that change.162 In fact, 
legal practice seems even more resistant to adapt to technology than 
other industries.163 Introducing a codified rule would help reduce that 
resistance, which would result in better, more affordable legal service to 
clients. 
 
V. TOWARD A CODIFIED DUTY TO GOOGLE 
  
There is ample support for, at least, enhancing Rule 1.1 to more 
fully describe an attorney’s responsibility to maintain technological 
proficiency, which could include guidance with respect to factual 
investigation of legal matters.164 Commentators are already calling on 
the ABA to provide guidance of the contours and extent of attorney’s 
duty to use technology in practice.165 Even then, it is clear as Katy Ho 
noted that “scholars and judges are still grappling with a functional 
definition for what would constitute competent representation within the 
era of this widely expanding digital age for attorneys.”166  An easy 
solution would be to provide additional guidance to attorneys about 
when they must use technology to investigate their matters, and how 
much technology they should use to meet their professional 
 
162 Id. See also Murphy, Just and Speedy, supra note 91.  
163 Murphy, Just and Speedy, supra note 91, at 36-36; Margolis, 
Medium, supra note 161 at 2, n.12, borrowing the observation that 
“many lawyers still practice law ‘as if it were 1999.’” (citing Nicole 
Black, Lawyers, Technology and a Light at the End of the Tunnel, THE 
DAILY RECORD (Nov. 6, 2013), 
http://nylawblog.typepad.com/suigeneris/2013/11/lawyerstechnology-
and-a-light-at-the-end-of-the-tunnel-.html. 
164 Johnson, supra note 157, at 186 (“A better option for the ABA and 
state regulators might be to follow in the footsteps of states like 
Colorado, Indiana, and New York, and edit the technology competence 
Comment directly. Providing additional clarity regarding what the term 
‘relevant technology’ encompasses may be seen by additional states as a 
method of providing clarity to lawyers seeking to fulfill their 
obligations.”). 
165 Ho, supra note 146, at 854. 
166 Id. at 6.  
DUTY TO GOOGLE 8/27/2020  4:03 PM 
  
 
40 
 
obligation.167  
 
a. Contents of a Codified Duty to Google 
 
 A codified Duty to Google – we could call it a “Duty of 
Technological Use in Investigations” – may best fit as part of, or its 
own, rule of professional conduct.  This detailed guideline or practice 
rule would take general standards of reasonableness and defensibility 
into account, including: (a) the issues and/or amount at stake in the 
matter; (b) the resources available to the attorney, including where 
applicable, the resources of the client; (c) and the availability of and 
cost to locate the overlooked information at the time of the search.168 It 
should also account for the growth and adoption of technology. 
Attorneys would not be required to be “early adopters” of advanced 
search technology under most circumstances, but would be required to 
stay reasonably current with widely-adopted technology.  
 
  Importantly, the reasonable standard should take into account the 
attorney’s professional judgment in evaluating the results of her search, 
 
167 Ho, supra note 146 at 867 (“The ABA should take a disciplined 
approach to rule-making by explicitly identifying areas in which 
technology amplifies concerns. By providing guidance and notice of 
potential ethical breaches concerning the use of technology, the ABA 
can balance specificity of the new rule with flexibility, allowing judges 
and bar associations to address new issues that arise from future 
technological developments. As a normative matter, setting explicit 
rules will help manage expectations and provide a minimum standard 
for attorneys to meet.”). 
168 This standard may be similar to the reasonableness standard with 
respect to a factual inquiry with respect to disclosures made in 
discovery. See Patrick Oot, Anne Kershaw, & Herbert Roitblat, 
Mandating Reasonableness in a Reasonable Inquiry, 87 DEN. U. L. 
REV. 533 (2010), citing St. Paul Reinsurance Co., 198 F.R.D. at 516 n.3 
“(1) the number and complexity of the issues; (2) the location, nature, 
number and availability of potentially relevant witnesses or documents; 
(3) the extent of past working relationships between the attorney and the 
client, particularly in related or similar litigation; and (4) the time 
available to conduct an investigation.”).  
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including the reliability of the sources of search results.  While this 
evaluation of reliability is not new to factual investigation, it is far more 
important of an exercise in professional judgment that it may have been 
previously. For example, is a result on the second or third page of 
search engine results so obviously available that the failure to notice it 
is sanctionable?169  This question is likely to be fact specific. It bears 
noting for any reasonableness determination that 95% of Google 
searchers never make it to the second page of results.170 Googling also 
requires the attorney to evaluate sources in a more advanced way than a 
pre-internet search comprising a check of a limited number of vetted 
information sources. Internet search engines tend to rank results by 
popularity, not veracity, and display unreliable information in the same 
manner as reliable information. 171 It is easy to confuse a misleading 
source with an “institutional depository of information.”172  
 
 It should also be clear that the attorney’s judgment is subject to the 
duty, and not the search algorithm’s effectiveness.173 This relationship 
between attorney and algorithm has been aptly described as the attorney 
 
169 See Jessica Lee, No. 1 Position in Google Gets 33% of Search 
Traffic [Study], SEARCH ENGINE WATCH (June 20, 2013), 
https://searchenginewatch.com/sew/study/2276184/no-1-position-in-
google-gets-33-of-search-traffic-study.   
170 Id. 
171 Colleen M. Barger, Accessing the Law: On the Internet, Nobody 
Knows You're a Judge: Appellate Courts' Use of Internet Materials, 4 J. 
APP. PRAC. & PROC. 417, 422 (2002) (nothing that it is commonly 
accepted worldwide that ”[t]he searcher is assured that she can use the 
Internet with ease, with confidence, with satisfaction”); Baker, supra 
note 16, at 570 (Observing that “information retrieval is generally now 
reliant upon algorithms to provide "relevant" results. The list of relevant 
results provided with relative ease is an absolute benefit of using 
algorithms in law.  It allows for great efficiency, which equates to 
greater access to justice. However, the problem is how competent it all 
looks, enticing lawyers to blindly rely on the results.”  
172 Barger, supra note 171, at 422.  
173 Baker, supra note 16, at 574. (Noting that “a lawyer, at a minimum, 
must be aware of the issues surrounding the use of algorithms and use 
reasonable care”).  
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acting as a “information fiduciary.”174 Jamie J. Baker, who first adapted 
the term, concludes that “competent lawyers must understand the 
information they rely on and provide advice to a client that is the result 
of the lawyer's independent, educated judgment.”175 In this way the 
attorney’s duty to interpret search results does not differ much for the 
attorney’s interpretation of, for example, due diligence research or a 
form contract.   
 
 It is possible to fashion criteria for evaluating an internet source, 
of course. Collen Barger has suggested that a critical internet researcher 
should examine “a site's completeness, along with its author and 
publisher, source of data, language, accuracy, currency, coverage, 
archiving, workability, stability, user interactivity, cost, and 
licensing”.176  Technological proficiency is, once again, essential to the 
reasonableness of the attorney’s judgment in interpreting search results. 
Lauren Kellerhouse notes that attorneys perform a similar task in 
interpreting search results in predictive coding searches in discovery, 
where attorneys much understand the technology to make sure it has 
worked correctly.177  Kellerhouse notes that this technical proficiency is 
in harmony with Comment 8’s charge that the attorney should “keep 
abreast of changes in the law and its practice, including the benefits and 
risks associated with relevant technology.”178 Attorneys must then 
understand search technology enough to critically evaluate its results. 
 
 The idea that an attorney must justify her judgment based on 
search result data does suggest an additional step upon which the 
adherence to the Duty to Google could be based: recordkeeping. 
Attorneys should save their internet search results and draft a memo to 
 
174 Id.  
175 Id.  
176 Barger, supra note 171, at 426 n.24, citing Mirela Roznovschi, 
Evaluating Foreign and International Legal Databases on the Internet, 
LLRX (Feb. 1, 1999),  https://www.llrx.com/1999/02/features-
evaluating-foreign-and-international-legal-databases-on-the-internet/.  
177 Kellerhouse, supra note 139, at 298-300.  Predictive coding is a 
method of machine-aided document review by with a computer 
algorithm and “machine learning” assist a reviewer in locating relevant 
information in a set of electronically stored information.  Id. at 298.  
178 Id. at 299. 
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file describing their interpretation of the results, along with any 
potential follow up research or tasks – realizing that the 
memorialization of this process cuts into the very time- and money-
saving benefits of the electronic search. Nevertheless, the existence of 
the attorney’s rationale for interpreting search results will be helpful in 
the application of the Duty to Google, as it provides a factfinder with 
the ability to evaluate the attorney’s judgment at the time, rather than in 
a backwards-looking manner. In the capital case context, the Supreme 
Court in Wiggins made a telling distinction in finding an inadequate 
investigation by concluding that “[t]he record of the actual sentencing 
proceedings underscores the unreasonableness of counsel's conduct by 
suggesting that their failure to investigate thoroughly resulted from 
inattention, not reasoned strategic judgment…”179  Attorneys should be 
ready to evidence their judgment in setting the scope of an 
investigation, including their use (or lack of use) of available search 
technology.  
  
b.  Applying the Duty to Google 
 
 Applying a Duty to Google takes some finesse. First, any attorney’s 
adherence to or deviation from the rule should be viewed under a 
reasonableness standard.180 Some parallels exist and perhaps some 
guidance can be found in courts’ application of the standard for 
effectiveness of counsel as it relates to an attorney’s duty to investigate 
facts in a criminal case, adopting the language from Rompilla that 
“reasonably diligent counsel may draw a line when they have good 
reason to think further investigation would be a waste.”181 
 
 Looking back from an ex ante approach has its dangers. It is 
important that judges avoid the approach in which the value of the 
 
179 Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 526. 
180 See Margolis, Safari, supra note 111 at 102 (Examining the use of 
the internet in determining the sufficiency of legal research and noting: 
“Since the court measures reasonableness by considering what other 
attorneys in a similar position would do, it follows that the research 
techniques employed by the majority of lawyers are those that are 
standard in practice, and thus set the bar for reasonableness.”). 
181 Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 383 (2005). 
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overlooked information affects the evaluation.182  A judge should 
instead focus on the cost of locating that information. For example, if a 
free Google search would not have located the information that the 
attorney missed, but a professional search firm would have found that 
information, the cost of the search firm should be a factor in 
determining reasonableness.   
 
In judging where a proper amount of Googling occurred, a ruling 
authority should be very careful to remember that timing is also an 
issue.  Internet searches are ephemeral – taking judicial notice of an 
internet search that the judge makes during the case creates a temporal 
problem.183 A reality of the internet is that content comes and goes in a 
 
182 This may cause some tension to the extent that a judge views a Duty 
to Google sanction in the same vein as a discovery sanction. Discovery 
sanctions in particular can require a court to examine the importance of 
information in question. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e)(1) (Requiring 
that a court considering discovery sanctions for spoliation of evidence 
weigh the “prejudice to another party” of the loss of evidence, which 
necessarily requires an examination of that evidence’s importance to the 
party); Cunningham v. Hamilton County, 527 U.S. 198 (1999) (In 
discovery, “[a]n evaluation of the appropriateness of sanctions may 
require the reviewing court to inquire into the importance of the 
information sought or the adequacy or truthfulness of a response”). 
183 Jill Lepore, Can the Internet Be Archived?, THE COBWEB BLOG, THE 
NEW YORKER (Jan. 26, 2015), 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/01/26/cobweb (Noting that  
“[t]he average life of a Web page is about a hundred days.”   While 
some technologies exist that can show web site as they existed at a 
certain point in time, such as the “Wayback Machine,” search results 
will invariably be different. As Lepore notes, “The Web dwells in a 
never-ending present. It is—elementally—ethereal, ephemeral, 
unstable, and unreliable.” Id. It is of no small concern to the Author of 
this Article that Lepore notes that the internet’s ephemeral nature is a 
particular issue for the legal profession: 
 
For the law and for the courts, link rot and content drift, 
which are collectively known as “reference rot,” have 
been disastrous. In providing evidence, legal scholars, 
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literal instant, and many links – perhaps even the ones in the footnotes 
of this Article184  – will disappear over time, a phenomenon known as 
“link rot.”185  If we are to hold attorneys to a standard of internet search 
competency, attorneys should be judged by the information available in 
such a search at the time they should have made it. A judge performing 
a proper search during the case is searching later – often much later – in 
time, and the judge’s search results in the present will likely be different 
than the attorney’s results in the past.   
 
This issue of timing raises the related question: how often should an 
attorney be Googling the parties, facts, witnesses and her own clients?   
Is it a failure to Google if the attorney runs a cursory search once a 
month? Once a year?  Again, the reasonableness of frequency and 
intensity of searches should depend on the issues and resources 
available. An attorney would be well advised to set up automatic 
“alerts” for certain keywords involving important clients or matters, so 
that she is automatically notified of potentially important new internet 
content.186  
 
lawyers, and judges often cite Web pages in their 
footnotes; they expect that evidence to remain where they 
found it as their proof, the way that evidence on paper—in 
court records and books and law journals—remains where 
they found it, in libraries and courthouses. But a 2013 
survey of law- and policy-related publications found that, 
at the end of six years, nearly fifty per cent of the URLs 
cited in those publications no longer worked. 
Id.  
184 As much as it pains the author of this Article to note. 
185 See Barger, supra note 171, at 438-439. Professor Barger points out 
the ironic observation of law librarian Mary Rumsey, author of a study 
about link rot, that “authors who cite Web sites instead of paper 
sources probably think they are making their sources more 
available to readers, rather than less."  Id., citing Mary Rumsey, 
Runaway Train: Problems of Permanence, Accessibility, and 
Stability in the Use of Web Sources in Law Review Citations, 94 L. LIB. 
J. 27, 34 (2002).  
186 For example, Google offers free Google Alerts, in which a user can 
have a daily, weekly or monthly email sent to them collecting new 
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Should an attorney Google each and every client, every matter? It is 
hard to say. There does not appear to be any recent cases that validate 
an attorney's investigation and make a point that the attorney did not 
perform an internet search, or that an internet search was unnecessary.  
However, such cases may exist. An attorney handling a routine matter 
for a long-standing client may not need to Google the matter, for 
example.  
 
It seems likely that in most matters of any size, some measure of 
Googling is required. Even a cursory Google search seems prudent in 
almost every circumstance. Think about that for a moment. In a little 
more than a generation, an attorney's duty to investigation has grown to 
the point where, at the absolute minimum, the attorney needs internet 
access and the ability to make a reasonably skilled internet search.187  
 
Is there an externality for the growth of search technology? Is an 
attorney's investigation now more expensive, because more information 
is available, even though relevant information is much easier to 
locate?188 After all, attorneys often bill by the hour and while internet 
searches take milliseconds, trolling through search results, reading, 
digesting and following up on those results can take some time. Given 
these cost considerations, it may be appropriate for an attorney in many 
instances to delegate the investigation duty to a paralegal or support 
staff. But in which instances? The line is certainly not clear, however it 
is common and ethically proper for attorneys to delegate their 
 
articles that meet user-defined keywords.  See, e.g., GOOGLE ALERTS, 
https://www.google.com/alerts.  
187 In fact, many law firms now exist without a physical location, 
particularly in a post-pandemic world. See, e.g., Will Boye, Law Firms 
Break from Traditional Model, CHARLOTTE BUSINESS JOURNAL (Oct. 
2010); Stephanie Kimbro, Practicing Law Online: Creating a Web-
Based Virtual Law Office,  
http://www.vlotech.com/ebooks/PracticingLawOnline.pdf.  
188 That technology would reduce time to perform a task but 
nevertheless increase cost in litigation has for years been the reality in 
litigation discovery. See generally Rebecca Simmons, Monica Lerma & 
Steve S. McNew, Discovery in 2016: New Rules, Cases and 
Technology, 74 ADVOCATE (TEXAS) 61 (2016). 
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professional responsibilities, under supervision.189 That being said, the 
higher the stakes and the more potentially important the information, 
the more the attorney will want to be involved in the internet search and 
analysis. 
 
c. Incorporating the Next Google 
 
One commentator notes that the Model Rules with respect to 
technological competence are drafted as “purposefully broad,” such that 
they can address “technologies that have not yet been conceived.”190  
However, the guidance thus far published about these rules has been 
extremely narrow, focusing mainly on data security.191 So while these 
rules can adjust to new technologies with respect to internet searching, 
absent any guidance, clarity, or specificity in the rules, attorneys are on 
their own to extrapolate the rules to new technologies.192 Indeed, there 
is some support for intentional flexibility in the rules and guidelines 
with respect to technological competence because technological 
innovation will invariably move faster than those rules and 
guidelines.193 Inherent in that flexibility is the tipping point in which a 
search technology becomes ubiquitous, in other words, the next 
“Google”.  
 
 
189 See R. Thomas Howell Jr. & Eric G. Orlinsky, What Paralegals Can 
Do: And the Light Goes On, ABA BUSINESS LAW TODAY (Jan./Feb. 
2007), https://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/blt/2007-01-
02/orlinsky.shtml. 
190 Lori D. Johnson, Navigating Technology Competence In 
Transactional Practice, 65 VILL. L. REV. 159, 170 (2020), citing Jamie 
J. Baker, Beyond the Information Age: The Duty of Technology 
Competence in the Algorithmic Society, 69 S.C. L. REV. 557, 557 
(2018). 
191 Id. 
192 See id. (Noting that “state regulators enacting and enforcing the 
Comment, as well as scholars who have discussed it, have instead 
provided narrow, prescriptive guidance and enforcement.”). 
193 Johnson, supra note 12, at 189 (noting that a flexible approach to 
evaluating technological competence in attorneys is essentially 
inevitable).  
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Most of this Article assumes that Google is the first, best, and last 
piece of technology to provide for an increased ability to conduct 
factual investigation into a legal matter. That is, of course, shortsighted. 
Somewhere in the world an entrepreneur is developing a piece of 
technology that will become as widely used as Google, and will affect 
many aspects of life, including factual investigations. At what point 
does that technology become the next “Google”, and thus part of the 
“Duty to Google”?  
 
Some parallels can be found in the development of electronic legal 
research. Ellie Margolis chronicled the evolution of this technology 
from “luxury” to “necessity”.194 Specifically, Margolis pointed to 
Shepardizing as an example of a technology that is so ubiquitous in 
legal practice as to be required for an attorney’s legal research work to 
be competent.195 She notes that certain factors contributed to the 
“expectation” that a technology would be used for competent legal 
research: (a) widespread use of the technology among attorneys in legal 
presentation, (b) attorneys routinely billing clients for use of the 
technology, (c) whether it is being routinely taught in law schools, and 
(d) whether it is necessary to access certain sources that are only 
available by using that technology.196  
 
 With those factors as a guide, the easiest place to see technological 
innovation where sources of information become ubiquitous (and in 
 
194 Ellie Margolis, Surfin' Safari - Why Competent Lawyers Should 
Research on the Web, 10 YALE J.L. & TECH. 82, 119 (2007-2008). 
195 Id. at 92. Indeed, it is notable that “Shepardizing”, like “Googling,” 
is a proper noun that has become ubiquitous.  
196 Margolis, Safari,  supra note 111, at 108-109; Id. at 113 (“While law 
librarians and others have raised concerns about the authenticity of 
official legal materials found only on the internet, today's reality is that 
the only way to access these materials is by conducting research on the 
internet, either through Westlaw, Lexis, or individual government 
websites. A lawyer who fails to use the internet, particularly when 
researching administrative issues, is likely to miss key sources that a 
judge would expect to see cited.”). 
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some cases, lose ubiquity) is in social media.197 Margaret DiBianca has 
noted that as of ten years ago “the American Academy of Matrimonial 
Lawyers reports that 66 percent of divorce attorneys use Facebook as 
their primary source for online evidence.”198  Law Schools have offered 
classes in the law of social media.199 And of course, the only way to 
access certain content on a social media site is to access its platform.  
 
d.Teaching the Duty to Google 
 
The bar and legal academia should incorporate internet fact-finding 
into basic legal training and continuing legal education.200 Several 
CLEs exist to teach attorneys how to conduct effective internet 
searches,201 but they tend to focus on building on a core competency 
that each attorney possesses.  This assumption is dangerous.  Attorney 
 
197 DiBianca, supra note 63, at 182 (Noting that “a lawyer's ethical 
duties may actually require him to become familiar with, if not make 
use of, social media.”). 
198 Id. at 183, citing Big Surge in Social Networking Evidence Says 
Survey of Nation's Top Divorce Lawyers, ACAD. OF MATRIMONIAL 
LAWYERS (Feb. 10, 2010), http://www.aaml.org/go/about-the-
academy/press/press-releases/big-surge-in-social-networking-evidence-
sayssurvey-of-nations-top-divorce-lawyers/. 
199 Law and Regulation of Social Media,  Columbia University Law 
School, https://www.law.columbia.edu/academics/courses/25613; 
Social Media Law Seminar, Stanford University Law School, 
https://law.stanford.edu/courses/social-media-law-seminar/.  
200 See Browning, supra note 8 at 196 (“But as a practical matter, how 
do we go about achieving the goal of technological competence? The 
key is education.”). 
201 See, e.g., Cybersleuth’s Guide to the Internet, supra note 2; 
Mastering Google for Investigative/Due Diligence Research | CLE 
https://www.facebook.com/events/1780577795587585/; 1.0 Ethics & 
2.0 General CLE Credits | CLE #2017-017. Ethics: Duty to Google ~ 
(ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.1 comment 8); 
Carole A. Levitt, Esq. & Mark E. Rosch, King County Bar Association 
CLE Brochure, Discover Hidden and Undocumented Google Search 
Secrets, KING COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION (Apr. 17, 2017), 
https://www.kcba.org/cle/pdf/278-Brochure.pdf. 
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technological competency is famously poor, despite such competency 
being an ethical requirement.202 There are anecdotal and empirical 
examples of skilled attorneys who lack technological competency.203 It 
may take an outreach program to educate the bar to bring its overall 
competency up to the appropriate level – if that level is discernable. 
This outreach program would incorporate basic skills for attorneys who 
need them but would feature recent technology, helping attorneys “keep 
up with the times.”  Further, it is notable, as Margolis pointed out, that 
advances in technology raise standards for competency, meaning that 
the expectations judges and clients have for attorney fact investigation 
are now higher (and will increase).204  
 
In the future, it is not difficult to see more state bar associations 
requiring technology CLE credit in the same specialized way that they 
require ethics CLE credit, and even to see law schools offer 
technological competency courses.205 While practicing attorneys 
 
202 Britton, supra note 13 at 34 (“Even back in the 19th century, lawyers 
were failing to adopt the newest technology -- the telephone. In 1891, 
7,000 businesses in the New York/New Jersey area had telephones. 
Among those, there were 937 doctors, 363 saloons, 315 stables, and last 
were 146 lawyers. Lawyers' biggest technological challenge, then, has 
nothing to do with a specific technology; the hesitation and reticence 
with which they adopt any technology is the primary obstacle they must 
overcome.”). 
203 Michael E. McCabe, Jr., What They Didn’t Teach in Law School: 
The Ethical Duty Of ‘Technical Competence’, MCCABE IP ETHICS LAW 
BLOG (Aug. 17, 2015), https://www.ipethicslaw.com/what-they-didnt-
teach-in-law-school-the-ethical-duty-of-technical-competence/ 
(Describing a colleague of his, a talented patent lawyer who never used 
a computer and urging attorneys to take CLEs to become 
technologically competent).  
204 Margolis, Safari, supra note 111, at 111 (“There is no doubt that the 
internet has raised the standard for competence in research when it 
comes to ensuring that a cited case is current and has not been overruled 
or invalidated.”). 
205 See Browning, supra note 8, at 196. Indeed, as Browning notes, 
Suffolk University Law School offers a six-course a Legal Innovations 
and Technology Certificate designed for practicing attorneys. Id.  
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reading this paragraph may have audibly groaned at yet another 
licensure requirement, closing the “technology gap” is a worthwhile 
enterprise. Attorneys who lack basic skills and resist innovation would 
be at least exposed to the technology they should be using, and more 
technologically savvy attorneys would have a good reason to stay 
current.  
CONCLUSION: LOOKING AHEAD 
It is clear that attorneys have a requirement to perform an internet 
search about prospective (and current) clients, witnesses, potential 
matters, and in certain cases, potential jurors.  It is less clear where that 
requirement extends to other areas of legal representation, and troubling 
that those areas may only be discovered after an attorney faces 
sanctions. Reliance on ethical opinions from state bar journals to avoid 
these sanctions is not enough. For guidance’s sake, codifying this 
requirement on its own, as part of the rules governing an attorney’s 
professional responsibility, makes sense. Drafters of such a rule face a 
real challenge of scope and depth as they search for the right balance 
between expectation and fairness. Greater detail with respect to an 
attorney’s technological competence will help the bar stop searching for 
answers about its Duty to Google. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
